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China MFN: A Reaffirmation of Tradition or
Regulatory Reform?
Gretchen Harders-Chen*
In 1980, China began its bid to reenter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1 and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 2 China then promulgated many new trade
regulations 3 in an attempt to meet GATT criticisms concerning
the lack of transparency in its trade laws. 4 On May 12, 1994
China enacted its most notable response to GATT criticism: the
5
Foreign Trade Law.
China's Foreign Trade Law sets forth general principles of
trade. Article 6 grants most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to
certain foreign nations. 6 The most-favored-nation principle of
* The author would like to thank Austin Chen and Bin Zhao for their
input in the translation of Chinese language materials referenced herein.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signatureOct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
2. The World Trade Organization Agreement was signed at Marrakesh on
April 15, 1994. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Doc.
MTN/FA, Part II, pp. 1-14, of Dec. 15, 1993; reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 5 (1995); 33 I.L.M. 13 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].

3.

Since 1978, China has implemented economic reform policies complePITMAN B. POTTER, FOREIGN BUSINESS LAW IN CHINA: PAST PROGRESS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 3 (1995). Chinese
efforts to enter GATT have given rise to additional reforms. Id.
4. HAROLD K. JACOBSON & MICHEL OKSENBERG, CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN
THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND GATT: TOWARD A GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER
90-92 (1990).
5. Foreign Trade Law of the Peoples' Republic of China, Act of May 12,
1994, 8 CHINA L. & PRAc. 20, 20 (1994) (hereinafter Foreign Trade Law).
6. "The Peoples' Republic of China grants Most Favored Nation treatment
or national treatment in the field of foreign trade to opposite concluding or acceding parties in accordance with international treaties or agreements concluded or acceded to, or on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit and
reciprocity." Id. at art. 6.
This Note addresses several permutations of MFN. China MFN refers specifically to the MFN provision of Article 6 of China's Foreign Trade Law; GATT
MFN references GATT, Article I:1. The U.S. extension of MFN to China arises
under The Jackson-Vansk Agreement. MFN generally appears in reference to a
treaty clause, although MFN as a broader principle is frequently discussed.

mented by a vigorous effort at legal reform.

382

82Mi. J GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 5:381

non-discrimination in trade is the cornerstone of the GATT. 7 By
adopting a most-favored-nation clause during its bid to enter the
GATT, China appears to demonstrate the compliance required
8
for successful reentry.
The MFN principle adopted by China, however, does not
simply reflect the GATT understanding of non-discrimination. 9
China's interpretation of MFN must be examined in the context
of the history of MFN in China, the recent debate between the
United States and China over China's MFN status, and the
changing role of law in Chinese economic reforms. China's interpretation of MFN will affect the enforcement of GATT principles if China becomes a member of the WTO.
In analyzing China's MFN clause, this Note interprets the
historical meaning of MFN in China. Part I addresses the implicit usage of MFN in China during the tribute system, which
was in place from 1368 to 1912. Part II considers the effect of
explicit MFN adoption in the unequal treaties of 1843 to 1923.
Part III discusses China's continued use of MFN from 1923 to
1970 in politics and treaties. Part IV outlines China's adoption
of MFN in its Foreign Trade Law of May 12, 1994. Part V discusses the implications China's history may have on China's
modern day interpretation of MFN and GATT/WTO
membership.
This Note concludes that adoption of an MFN principle by
China appears to be a genuine political effort to comply with the
7.

SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE,

SUBCOMM. ON INT'L TRADE, EXECUTnVE

BRANCH GATT STUDY No. 9: THE MOsT-FAVORED-NATION PROVISION, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 133 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter ExEcuTIVE BRANCH GATT
STUDIES].
8. Xiao Wang, Trade Law Meets International Standards, Bus. WKLY.
(CHINA DAILY Supp.), Aug. 15, 1994, at 1.
9. The MFN principle as currently applied in GATT developed primarily
from European history.
The concept embodied in the MFN clause has been traced to the 12th
century, although the phrase "most-favored-nation" did not appear until the end of the 17th century. The emergence of the MFN provision is
largely attributable to the growth of world commerce in the 15th and
16th centuries. At that time England and Holland were competing
with Spain and Portugal, and the French and the Scandinavians were
challenging the Hanseatic League and the Italian Republics. Each
country, seeking maximum advantage for its trade, found itself [compelled to grant concessions in return. The role of the MFN provision]
was to link commercial treaties through time and between states. At
first the MFN provision applied to concessions granted only to specified
states, but gradually the clause became generalized to apply to concessions granted to all countries.
ExEcUTrvE BRANCH GATT STUDY, supra note 7, at 133-35.
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GATT. Nevertheless, adoption of MFN must be analyzed in the
context of Chinese history, the prior usage of MFN in Chinese
treaties, Chinese traditions of foreign policy and the domestic
debate in China over GATT membership. These factors indicate
that in construing the requirements imposed by GATT/WTO
membership China will most likely apply MFN according to its
unique perspective on foreign relations.
I. HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF THE MOSTFAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE IN CHINA: THE
TRIBUTE SYSTEM (1362-1912)
The concept of MFN has historical significance in China
dating back several hundred years.' 0 From the Chinese Ming
dynasty (1368-1644) through the Manchu Qing dynasty (16441912), Chinese foreign relations were based upon the tribute
system.' The tribute system combined trade and military defense into one system of foreign relations.12 Countries located
beyond China's political frontier dispatched tribute bearing missions to Peking and, in return, these missions received patents
13
of office for foreign rulers as tributaries to China's emperor.
Between 1662 and 1911, over five hundred tribute missions arrived at Peking from sixty-two different countries.1 4 The tribute
system acted as a boundary between the barbarian world and
6
Confucian China, 15 and as a vehicle for foreign relations.'
10. 1 JOHN KING FAIRBANK, TRADE AND DIPLOMACY ON THE CHINA COAST,
THE OPENING OF THE TREATY PORTS 1842-1854, 198-99 (1953).
11. MARK MANCALL, CHINA AT THE CENTER: 300 YEARS OF FOREIGN POLICY
13 (1984).
China developed a system for the conduct of its foreign relations that
was the institutional expression of its social ideology, on the one hand,
and, on the other, the direct reflection and consequence of the political
and economic needs of Chinese society and the technological level that
that society has-reached. This system, which evolved through the centuries, reached its classical form in the Ming and Qing dynasties. The
so-called tribute system functioned and functioned well, until the middle of the nineteenth century, when economic, social, technological,
and ideological changes in the world outside China reached a point
where the system had to give way before them.
Id. at 12.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 15-16. While borders would shift as the outside world impinged
upon China, the fluctuations were due to the dynasty's loss of the mandate of
heaven, not China's view of itself as the central kingdom. Id.

16.

FAIRBANK,

supra note 10, at 30.
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The tribute system embodied Chinese and Confucian concepts and summarized patterns of behavior long practiced in
Chinese civilization. 17 "[Tihe tribute system was a total system
for the conduct of all international relations. The intermeshing
of China and the surrounding communities took place on several
levels: ideological, ritual and economic. 18 China viewed itself
as superior, not just materially, but culturally. 19 Barbarians
could come to appreciate the superiority of the Chinese culture if
they recognized the unique position of China as the central kingdom exercising the mandate of heaven. 20 The tribute system illustrates China's traditional view of foreign relations:
Neither China nor Chinese civilization existed from the Confucian
point of view. There was only civilization and barbarism, which were
conceptually related in that they defined each other. Civilization was
'an empire without neighbors.' In this sense the Chinese state was not
a state in the conventional Western mold; rather, it was the administration of civilized society in toto. .... 21

Thus, traditional Chinese foreign relations did not fully recognize foreign countries as sovereigns.
Tribute took place through ceremonial rituals established
by the Chinese government. 22 Once a country paid tribute,
China allowed it the opportunity for trade. 23 The tributary
country gave objects of value to Peking, while Peking gave gifts
24
in exchange which served to subsidize the costs of the mission.
Tribute missions included merchants who brought goods that
could be sold at the frontier or transported duty free to the capital where they would be sold at a special market closely super17. A summary of the tribute system may be found in MANCALL, supra note
11, at 13-39.
18. Id. at 20.
19. FAiaBANK, supra note 10, at 26.
20. Id. at 27. China (Zhongguo [ r i1
I), means literally central kingdom. The Emperor calls himself the Son of Heaven (tianzi [
1) and
]),
tianxia [ A -T I describes China as the land below Heaven.
21. MANcALL, supra note 11, at 22 (quoting Vadime Elisseeff, 42 DIOGENES
60-64 (Summer, 1963)).
22. Id. at 27. The tributary missions were regulated as to size and lodging,
and they were under constant surveillance. FAiRBANK, supra note 10, at 28-29.
The tributary missions underwent court ceremonies that involved an exchange
of courtesies; the Chinese rulers provided numerous banquets and the foreign
participants performed kowtow, kneeling and bowing their heads to the ground.
Id. at 29. This served to confirm China's superior status and acknowledged the
universal order of Confucian ideology. Id.
23. MANCALL, supra note 11, at 32.
24. Id. at 41.
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vised by Chinese authorities. 2526 Trade outside of the official
market was strictly prohibited.
During the Ming dynasty, the tributary relationships were
supervised under the Board of Rites, which maintained the correct implementation of rituals central to Chinese social practice. 2 7 The Manchu Qing dynasty altered this system by
establishing the Li-fan Yuan, properly translated as the Barbarian Control Office. 28 Under both systems, the tributary mission
itself involved an economic exchange. Tribute did away with
conflict and allowed trade to take place with the tributary country. In this sense, tribute was a sanction for commercial
29
activity.
It is important to note that trade in the tribute system was
always connected with politics. "[W]hile both the presentation
of tribute and the exchange of goods in the marketplace appeared voluntary, in reality they were distinctly obligatory for
30
each side, under the sanction of warfare or natural disaster."
Because China's tradition of haggling occasionally erupted in
wider conflict, tribute was often used to reduce tensions.3 1 "To
misread tribute as a cover for trade and to understand trade as a
purely commercial activity is to distort the nature of the tradi32
tional institutions of the sinocentric international order."
Though China did not view its neighbors as separate nations, China developed diverse economic and diplomatic relations with its neighbors. "The tribute system was a bilateral,
never a multilateral, relationship, in which one partner was always the ruler of China."3 3 Though Confucian China viewed
trade as subordinate to tribute, foreign trade grew within the
25. FAIRBANK, supra note 10, at 32.
26. Id.
27. MANCALL, supra note 11, at 16-17.
28. Id. at 17. This institution performed the same rituals as the traditional
Chinese system. Id. Xinjiang, Tibet and Mongolia were included under the Lifan Yuan, rather than the Board of Rites. Id. While the Ming dynasty was
formed under the difference between China and non-China, the Manchu view
was more complex. Id. at 18. The societies of the East, Southeast and South
Asia were governed under the Board of Rites, while the northern crescent was
governed under the Li-fan Yuan. Id. at 17-19.
29. Id. at 42. Though Russia did not present tribute to China, China chose
to assume that the Russian individuals who did present tribute were envoys
from the Russian court. Id.
30. Id. at 43.
31. Id. at 43-44.
32. Id. at 44.
33. Id. at 23.
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ancient tributary framework, especially maritime trade. 34
China traded with Portugal through Macao, Britain through
Canton, the Koreans on the Korean border and the Russians at
Kyakhta. 3 5 China also traded discretely with caravans that
travelled along established routes to Peking that did not seem to
36
compete with each other.
Two conflicting views of bilateral trading relationships arise
from the tribute system. On the one hand, China treated all
barbarians alike. "The most-favored-nation clause had its origin
partly in the Confucian monarch's inveterate benevolence to all
37
barbarians alike, the better to use them against one another."
This supports the idea of non-discrimination. For example, tax
and tribute were functionally and economically indistinguishable in China's pre-modern economy. 3 8 China did not need to
distinguish between countries paying tribute to grant trading
privileges.
On the other hand, China had a tradition of "using the barbarian to control the barbarian."39 China created tensions between inferior members of the hierarchy without endangering
the hierarchy itself.40 Unequal treatment furthered the aims of
maintaining the supremacy of Chinese civilization. The tribute
system ideologically embodied the inherent contradictions of

34.
35.

FAIRBANK, supra note 10, at 33-38.
MANCALL, supra note 11, at 54-55.

36. Id. at 55. The trade included gift trade in the form of tribute-gift exchange, market trade that did not appear until Western nations competed with
each other at Canton and the main type, administered trade. Id. Administered
trade required trading with a fixed entity and developed on the ports. Id. at 5556. While ports of trade were generally the product of universal experience,
China articulated this institution within its traditional pattern of commercial
behavior. Id. at 56-57. The licensed traders at Kyakhta, the designated "hong
merchants" of Canton, and the caravan merchants of Inner Asia officially recognized for trade at Peking were all participants in an administered trade within
the context of a pre-market economy. Id. at 57-59.
37. FAIRBANK, supra note 10, at 466. The relationship between the barbarian and emperor was reciprocal. Id. at 27. The emperor functioned by being
compassionate and generous and the humble submission of the foreigner appropriately responded to imperial virtue. Id. at 27-28. "His 'tender cherishing of
men from afar' (huai-jou yuan-jen) is one of the cliches in all documents on foreign relations." Id. at 27.
38. MANCALL, supra note 11, at 60.
39. Id. at 32. This policy was used to defend a weak dynasty through diplomatic maneuvers. Id.
40. Id. at 32. The distribution of gifts was a kind of protection money intended to buy off potential barbarian predators. Id.
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and

strategic

unequal

treatment

to

barbarians.

Unequal or non-reciprocal treatment in trade policy dates
back to the tribute system. The countries tributary to China offered tribute not simply in exchange for trade, but also under
the sanction of war. 4 2 Tribute was used to ease tensions and

China was generally recognized as superior to its tributary
countries.
The development of MFN in Europe has a different historical context. MFN first appeared in European treaties in the seventeenth century as a tool for dealing between different
to be effective in trade conflicts between
sovereigns and proved
43
multiple sovereigns.
The Chinese tribute system, in contrast, relied on different
assumptions of sovereignty. The concept of multiple sovereign
nations did not exist under the tribute system where China was
the superior party in bilateral relationships. The tributary
country deferred politically to China. 44 Thus, the European recognition of separate sovereigns underlying the most-favored-nation clause is not reflected in Chinese history.
Under the tribute system, the moral value of tribute was
important to China's rulers, whereas the material value of trade
was important to the barbarians. 45 China was therefore unprepared to accommodate the changes of trade brought about by
maritime relations. Even at the designated trading ports, the
bilateral negotiation was predicated on paying tribute in some
form. 46 The complexities of Chinese negotiation under the trib-

ute system mirror some aspects of negotiation between multiple
sovereigns, but it did not extend beyond the basic assumption
that Chinese administration encompassed civilized society and
could not bend to other institutional structures.

41. This illustrates the complexity and sophistication of Chinese civilization under the tribute system. While the emperor treated the barbarians with
benevolence, the emperor also used the barbarians against one another to prevent attacks against China's dynasty. Id. at 23, 32.
42. FAmBANK, supra note 10, at 24.
43. See ExEcUTrivE BRANCH GATT STUDY, supra note 7; JOHN JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 249-50 (1969).
44. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
45. FAIRBANK, supra note 10, at 33.
46. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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EXPLICIT ADOPTION OF THE MFN PRINCIPLE IN
CHINA: THE UNEQUAL TREATIES (1843-1923)

The nineteenth century brought significant changes to the
tribute system. Under the tribute system, China was primarily
a redistributive internal economy and entered bilateral contractlike relationships in trade,4 7 until the Europeans presented
themselves at the China coast.
The tribute system could be modified and stretched as an intermeshing
mechanism but only to a point; beyond that point its destruction was
implicit in any further adjustment to the institutional peculiarities of
the non-Chinese partner. This point of tension was reached when economic institutional expectations of the English in the nineteenth century passed beyond the ability of the tribute system to mediate
between English concepts of free trade and traditional Chinese
con48
cepts of the proper economic organization of the universe.

Though trade had developed at Canton with the British under
the tributary system, the system at Canton began to break down
with corruption of Chinese officials, corruption of private traders
and a flourishing opium trade. 49 These factors, combined with
the differences between Chinese and British trade policies, led
to war in the middle of the nineteenth century. 50 After China

lost the First Opium War (1839-1842), the tribute system gave
51

way to the treaty system.
On October 8, 1843, China and Britain signed the "Supple52
mentary Treaty" to set up a system of treaty law at Canton.
[The British] objectives were simple: to give the British merchant access to a free market and to protect him by law in his exploitation of
it.... It was equally important that trade should be free to expand
within agreed limits
and that the law should expand with it to see that
53
it remained free.
The victory won by Britain was expanded multilaterally under
"the neatest diplomatic device of the century,"5 4 the most-favored-nation clause.
47. MANCALL, supra note 11, at 55.
48. Id. at 44.
49. FAIRBANK, supra note 10, at 57. The opium trade arose out of the disparities of increasing Chinese exports of tea and silk and no equivalent British
commodity. Id. at 59-60.
50. MANCALL, supra note 11, at 44. "One fundamental cause of the crisis at
Canton after 1834, and so of the first Anglo-Chinese war in 1840-42, was the
expansion of trade beyond the limits of the ancient Canton system of regulation." FAIRBANK, supra note 10, at 65.
51. MANCALL, supra note 11, at 118.
52. FAMANK, supra note 10, at 104.
53. Id.
54. JoHN KING FAIRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 169 (1983).
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MFN first appeared explicitly in the Supplementary Treaty
of October 8, 1843 to the Nanking Treaty with Britain.5 5 Article
VIII of the Supplementary Treaty sets forth the first MFN
clause in China: "... . [I]t is further agreed, that should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be pleased to grant

additional privileges or immunities to any of the subjects or Citizens of such Foreign Countries, the same privileges and immunities will be extended to and enjoyed by British Subjects; but it
is to be understood that demands or requests are not, on this
plea, to be unnecessarily brought forward." 56 Any privilege or

immunity granted to other foreign nations were to be extended
automatically to Great Britain. In other words, Great Britain
obtained unconditional MFN status. Though this first treaty
does not use the term MFN specifically, MFN appears in subsequent treaties with Great Britain.5 7 MFN also appeared in

China's treaties with the United States and France in 1844.58
55.

Supplementary Treaty, Oct. 8, 1843, Gr. Brit.-China, reprinted in 1

TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, ETC. BETWEEN CHINA AND FOREIGN STATES 390 (2d ed.
1917) [hereinafter 1 CHINA TREATIES].

56. Id. at 393, art. VIII.
57. See Treaty of Tientsin, June 26, 1858, Gr. Brit.-China, art. LIV, reprinted in 1 CHINA TREATIES, supra note 55, at 404, 419:
The British Government and its subjects are hereby confirmed in all
privileges, immunities, and advantages conferred on them by previous
Treaties; and it is hereby expressly stipulated that the British Government and its subjects will be allowed free and equal participation in all
privileges, immunities, and advantages that may have been or may be
hereafter granted by his Majesty the Emperor of China to the Government or subjects of any other nation.
See also Supplementary Convention To The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 3, 1869, Gr. Brit.-China, art. II, reprintedin 1 CHINA TREATIES, supra
note 55, at 478, 479 ("The Consuls so appointed shall respectively be entitled to
the treatment accorded to the most favoured nation."); Commercial Treaty,
Sept. 5, 1902, Gr. Brit.-China, sec. 14, reprinted in 1 CHINA TREATIES, supra
note 55, 543, 554 ("The condition on which the Chinese Government enter into
the present engagement is that all Powers entitled to most favoured nation
treatment in China enter into the same engagements as Great Britain with
regard to the payment of surtaxes and other obligations....").
58. See Treaty of Wang-Hea, July 3, 1844, U.S.-China, art. II, reprintedin
1 CHINA TREATIES, supra note 55, at 677:
Citizens of the United States resorting to China for the purpose of commerce will pay the duties of import and export prescribed by the Tariff
which is fixed by and made a part of this Treaty. They shall in no case
be subject to other or higher duties than are or shall be required of the
people of any other nation whatever.
See Treaty of Whampoa, 1844, Fr.-China, art. VI, reprinted in 1 CHINA TREATIES, supra note 55, at 771, 774:
A l'6gard du Tarif, aussi bien que pour toute stipulation introduite ou A
introduire dans les Traites existants ou qui seraient ult~rieurement
conclus, il demeure bien et dfiment dtabli que les n~gociants, et, en
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These treaties set forth the system known as the "unequal
treaties."5 9 The main features of the treaties were Chinese
grants of extraterritoriality and the establishment of a treaty
tariff.60 Extraterritorial provisions created areas in China
which were governed by foreign law and policed by foreign
6
military. '
Peking was now required to establish a treaty tariff [that was fixed by
foreign powers] on all imported goods, which meant the imposition of
free trade theories that were the core of the expanding capitalist worldeconomic system. This regulation, in turn, was reinforced by the
treaty
prohibition against the organization of trade on the Chinese
62
side.

China did not receive any equivalent grant of MFN from Great
Britain. 63 Hence, the unequal treaties required China to impose
tariffs fixed by treaty obligations without any equivalent tariff
concessions. These tariff obligations were automatically extended multilaterally through the MFN obligation in direct contravention of China's history under the tribute system of
negotiating tariffs through limited bilateral agreements at des64
ignated ports of trade or the custom of taxation by tribute.
Foreign powers rushed to obtain the advantages of the unequal treaties. MFN was granted in bilateral treaties between
68
67
China and the United States, 65 Russia, 6 6 Belgium, Sweden,
gdn6ral, tous les citoyens frangais en Chine, auront droit, toujours et
partout, au traitement de la nation la plus favoris6e.
See also Treaty of Tientsin, June 27, 1858, Fr.-China, art. LV, reprinted in 1
CHINA TREATIES, supra note 55, at 814, 834.
59. MANCALL, supra note 11, at 118. The term "unequal treaties" first formally appeared in the Kuomintang Manifesto. Charlotte Ku, Abolition of
China's Unequal Treaties and the Search for Regional Stability in Asia, 19191943, 12 CHINESE Y.B. OF INT'L L. AND AFF. 67, 80 (1992-94); Li CHIEN-NUNG,
THE PoLrrIcAL HISTORY OF CHINA 1840-1928, 447 (1956).
60. FAIRBANK, supra note 54, at 167-69.
61. MANCALL, supra note 11, at 119. The MFN clause extended this privilege automatically to nationals of any other country maintaining a treaty with
China. Id.
62. Id.
63. See 1 CHINA TREATIES, supra note 55; Treaty of Tientsin, supra note 57;
Supplementary Convention to the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, supra
note 57; Commercial Treaty, supra note 57.
64. See notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
65. Treaty of Tientsin, Dec. 21, 1858, U.S.-China, art. XXX, reprintedin 1
CHINA TREATIES, supra note 55, at 713, 726:
The contracting parties hereby agree that should at any time the TaTsing Empire grant to any nation, or the merchants or citizens of any
nations, any right, privilege, or favour connected either with navigation, commerce, political or other intercourse which is not conferred by
this Treaty, such right, privilege, and favour shall at once freely enure
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Germany, 69 Portugal, 70 Denmark, 7 1 the Netherlands, 7 2 Spain, 73
to the benefit of the United States, its public officers, merchants, and
citizens.
Article VI and Article VII also apply equal treatment to Chinese and United
States subjects under most-favored-nation. Additional Articles to the Treaty,
June 18, 1858, U.S.-China, art. VI, art. VII, reprinted in 1 CHINA TREATIES,
supra note 55, at 729, 732.
It is expressly agreed, however, that citizens of the United States shall
at no time pay other or higher duties than those paid by the citizens or
subjects of the most favored nation. Conversely, Chinese subjects shall
not pay higher duties on their imports into the United States than
those paid by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation.
Commercial Treaty, Oct. 8, 1903, U.S.-China, art. V, reprintedin 1 CHINA TREATIES, supra note 55, at 745, 750.
66. Treaty of Tientsin, 1858, Russia-China, art. XII, reprinted in 1 CHINA
TREATIES, supra note 55, at 85, 90.
Tous les privileges politiques, commerciaux ou autres, qui pourraient
dans la suite 6tre acquis par les 8tats les plus favoris~s par le
Gouvernement chinois seront 6tendus en mime temps sur la Russie
sans que cela n~cessite des n~gociations pr~alables.
Id.
67. Treaty of Peking, Nov. 2, 1865, Belg.-China, art. XLV, reprinted in 2
TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, ETC. BETWEEN CHINA AND FOREIGN STATES 4, 21 (2D
ED. 1917) [HEREINAFrER 2 CHINA TREATIES].
11 est convenu entre les Hautes Parties contractantes qu'il sera accordd
4 la Belgique et aux Belges participation pleine et 6gale 4 tous les privildges, immunites et avantages qui ont 6t accordds ou seront conc~d6s
dordnavant par Sa Majestd l'Empereur de la Chine au gouvernement
ou aux sujets d'une autre nation quelconque.
Id.
68. Treaty of Peking, July 2, 1908, Swed.-China, art. II, reprinted in 2
CHINA TREATIES, supra note 67, at 97, 98.
The Diplomatic Representatives thus accredited shall enjoy all the prerogatives, privileges, and immunities accorded by international usage
to such Representatives, and they shall also in all respects be entitled
to the treatment extended to similar Representatives of the most
favoured nation.
Id.
69. Treaty of Tientsin, Sept. 2, 1861, Germany-China, art. 40, reprintedin
2 CHINA TREATIES, supra note 67, at 115, 134.
Die contrahirenden Theile kommon uberein, dass den Deutschen
Staaten und ihren Unterthanen volle und gleiche Theilnahme an allen
Privilegien, Freiheiten und Vortheilen zustehen soll, welcher von
Seiner Majestft dem Kaiser von China der Regierung oder den Unterthanen irgend einer andern Nation gewdhrt sind oder noch gewdhrt
werden mogen.
Id.
70. Treaty of Tientsin, Aug. 13, 1862, Port.-China, art. LII, reprintedin 2
CHINA TREATIES, supra note 67, at 251, 271; Treaty of Peking, Dec. 1, 1887,
Port.-China, art. X, reprinted in 2 CHINA TREATIES, supra note 67, at 274, 278.
71. Treaty of Tientsin, July 13, 1863, Den.-China, art. LIV, reprintedin 2
CHINA TREATIES, supra note 67, at 313, 329.
72. Treaty of Tientsin, Oct. 6, 1863, Neth.-China, art. XV, reprinted in 2
CHINA TREATIES, supra note 67, at 339, 350.
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Italy, 7 4 Austria-Hungary, 7 5 Japan, 76 Peru, 7 7 Mexico, 78 and Korea. 79 Though Chinese-Manchu negotiators introduced the
MFN principle as a bargaining tool for China, the numerous bilateral treaties had the opposite effect of destroying China's bargaining power.
It is ironic that the Chinese-Manchu policy of equal treatment of the
Western nations, although intended to keep them divided and facilitate playing off one against another, had the opposite effect of consolidating them. Because China was the weaker side and on the
defensive, the most-favored-nation clause proved to be a one-way
street - any concession or privilege gained by one Western power at
once accrued to all. China could never reverse the tide and, by abolishing the privileges of one power, eliminate those of others. Treaty privileges steadily accumulated against her interest.8 0

Thus, the unequal treaties greatly weakened Chinese institutional structure. 8 '
The unequal treaties had a serious negative impact on
China, both psychologically and materially.8 2 The Chinese
viewed the unequal treaties as according least favored nation
status to China.8 3 The most significant complaint about the unTreaty of Tientsin, Oct. 10, 1864, Spain-China, art. L, reprinted in 2
supra note 67, at 359, 375 [English version at 386].
74. Treaty of Peking, Oct. 26, 1866, Italy-China, art. LIV, reprinted in 2
CHINA TREATIES, supra note 67, at 403, 419 [English version at 449].
75. Treaty of Peking, Sep. 2, 1869, Aus.-Hung.-China, art. XLIII, reprinted
in 2 CHINA TREATIES, supra note 67, at 457, 475 [English version at 504].
76. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, July 21, 1896, Japan-China, art.
IX, reprinted in 2 CHINA TREATIES, supra note 67, at 604, 607-08; Supplementary Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 8, 1903, Japan-China, art I, reprinted in 2 CHINA TREATIES, supra note 67, at 617, 618.
77. Treaty of Tientsin, Aug. 7, 1874, Peru-China, art. XVI, reprinted in 2
73.

CHINA TREATIES,

CHINA TREATIES,

supra note 67, at 798, 805-06.

Treaty of Washington, Dec. 14, 1899, Mex.-China, art VIII, reprinted in
2 CHINA TREATIES, supra note 67, at 833, 837.
79. Treaty of Seoul, Sept. 11, 1899, Korea-China, art. III, reprinted in 2
CHINA TREATIES, supra note 67, at 864, 865-66.
80. FAIRBANK, supra note 10, at 198.
81. "After the disintegration of the tribute system and the conceptual
structures that institutional complex implied, the unequal treaty system left
the Empire with neither the institutions to protect its own interests nor the
means to modify the conceptual world in which it interacted with the foreign
powers." MANCALL, supra note 11, at 128.
82. WILLIAM L. TUNG, CHINA AND THE FOREIGN PowERs: THE IMPACT OF AND
REACTION TO UNEQUAL TREATIES 9 (1970).
83. Id. at 127.
Evidently, it was not equity and justice but power and self-interest
that governed the policies of most of the foreign powers toward China
throughout the nineteenth century. Although new treaties later concluded by China with other powers adhered to the principles of equality and reciprocity, it almost took a century for the Chinese people to
78.
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equal treaties was the lack of reciprocity in negotiations. 8 4 The
lack of reciprocity attained by the MFN clause in the unequal
treaties is reflected in China's modern day concern for reciprocity in foreign relations.
There are several similarities between the tribute system
and the unequal treaty system:
Like the tribute system before it, the unequal treaty system was multinational. Its basic forms and structures were established in one bilateral treaty, but various diplomatic mechanisms were used to extend

these features to other nations through a whole series of bilateral treaties; the same structural relationships established with one country
were replicated in relationships with others. The unequal treaty sys-

tem was also like the tribute system in that it described a set of uneOikoumene [Western countries]
qual relationships except that now the
85
was superior to the Empire [China].

Both the tribute system and the unequal treaty system use only
bilateral relationships which requires viewing other nations as
equal in their relationship to each other and as unequal in their
relationship to China. The unequal treaties differed from the
tribute system in that they did not grant China the power to
treat foreign nations differently and establish a reciprocal bilateral relationship.
When China participated in MFN through the unequal treaties, China's position in the international world order was
turned upside down. While China exploited and manipulated
tributary countries under the tribute system, China became the
subject of manipulation under the unequal treaties.8 6 This suggests a historical justification for China to be cautious in granting MFN to other nations.8 7 China may be more inclined to
limit its grants of MFN status to ensure that a bloc of nations do
not encroach upon China's sovereignty, as European nations did
through the unequal treaties.8 8 At the very least, China will be
concerned that its concessions are reciprocated by other nations.
abolish the inequitable terms of early treaties, which accorded, in turn,
the least favored nation treatment to them.
Id.
84. Id. at 126. "In conclusion, many rights and privileges acquired by foreigners in China were legitimate. Nor were the general provisions of the mostfavored-nation clause unreasonable. Complaints by the Chinese were, however,
centered on the lack of [reciprocity] [sic]." Id.
85. MANCALL, supra note 11, at 118.
86. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (outlining the disadvan-

tages of the unequal treaty system).
87.

See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.

88. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting European exploitation of Chinese trade through the use of MFN in the unequal treaties).
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Like the tribute system before it, the unequal treaty system
combined trade and politics. Coercive politics played a significant role in China's adoption of the MFN principle in the unequal treaties. It was Britain's victory over China in the Opium
Wars that created the unequal treaties.8 9 The psychological and
economic damage of the unequal treaty system did not disappear after the treaties were reversed. 90 The unequal treaties remain a memory of China's ineffective policies in its relationships
with Western powers accomplished by means of the MFN
clause.
III.

CHINA'S CONTINUING USE OF MFN: THE
KUOMINTANG AND COMMUNIST CHINA
(1923-1970)

MFN continued to appear in Chinese politics even after the
unequal treaty system began to fail. In 1911 the Kuomintang
(KMT) overthrew the Manchu regime and in 1926-28, they unified China. 9 ' Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the KMT, set forth
the ideological basis of the KNIT rule in China. 9 2 His lectures
and writings included detailed criticism of the unequal treaty
system and implicitly MFN. "Other nations meet foreign economic pressure and check the invasion of economic forces from
abroad by means of a tariff which protects economic development within these countries ....
[China's] custom duties are
fixed by the foreign powers. .. ."93 In 1923 the KMT formally
introduced into the Chinese national consciousness the term
"unequal treaties" in their Manifesto. 94 The KMT used the abolishment of the unequal treaties as a rallying cry to help bring
them into power in China. 9 5 China did not want to fully abro89. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (detailing origins of the
unequal treaty system).
90. TUNG, supra note 82, at 249-74 (outlining China's diplomacy in peace
and war for the abolition of the unequal treaties).
91. CHINESE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, CHINA HANDBOOK, 1937-1943, A
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA IN SIX YEARS OF

WAR 39 (1943) [hereinafter CHINA HANDBOOK].
92. Id. at 40. The highest guiding principles in China were nationalism,
people's rights, and people's livelihoods. Id.
93. Id. at 68. Dr. Sun Yat-sen claims China had sustained an annual loss
of $1.2 billion due to invasion of foreign goods, invasion of foreign paper money
into Chiina's money market, freight charges on exports and imports, taxes, rents
and land sales on ceded property, special privileges for foreign business, and
speculation business. Id.
94. Ku, supra note 59, at 80.
95. Id. at 81.
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gate the treaties, and instead
sought to eliminate the unequal
96
elements of the treaties.
As part of its platform, in 1924 the KMT offered MFN treatment to any foreign nation which voluntarily surrendered its
rights as part of its platform. 97 "China shall recognize all states
which voluntarily relinquish their special rights and voluntarily
renounce treaties detrimental to Chinese sovereignty as mostfavored nations."9 8 The KMT thus used the MFN principle as
both a political principle and as a diplomatic tool. The movement to wipe out the unequal treaties resulted in some modifications during the Washington Conference in 1922 and by 1930,
the KMT recovered tariff autonomy.9 9 These negotiations
ceased from 1931-1932 when Japanese aggression gave both
China and the Europeans a common interest to preserve European presence in China. 10 0
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party defeated the KMT
and marshaled in a new era of economic and diplomatic relations. 10 1 The history of unequal treaties combined with Marxist
ideology led China to de-emphasize trade in the twentieth century. 10 2 "Marxism viewed trade between developing and industrialized countries primarily as a form of exploitation." 0 3
Interestingly, the most-favored-nation principle did not disappear. China continued to grant MFN status, but only to
friendly nations. In the 1950's and 1960's, China granted MFN
status to Yemen,' 0 4 the Soviet Union, 10 5 Albania, 10 6
96.
97.
tional
57.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
The Kuomintang's Political Program (adopted by the First Party NaCongress in Jan. 1924) reprinted in CHINA HANDBOOK, supra note 91, at
Id.
FAIRBANK, supra note 54, at 248.

Id.

DENIS TWITCHETT & JOHN K. FAIRBANK, 14 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
CHINA 51 (1987).
102. JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 4, at 143.

103. Id.
104. Sino-Yemeni Treaty of Commerce, Jan. 13, 1958, Yemen-P.R.C., art. 2,
reprinted in GRANT F. RHODE & REID E. WmTLOCK, TREATIES OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1978, 119 (1980) hereinafter P.R.C. TREATIES]. "The
government of both parties shall grant each other the most favored nation
treatment in respect of commodities imported into the territory of one party
from that of the other." Id.
105. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 23, 1958, U.S.S.R.-P.R.C.,
art. 8, reprinted in P.R.C. TREATIES, supra note 104, at 123, 125. "The vessels
and the cargoes on vessels of either of the contracting parties shall be accorded
in the ports of the other party most-favored-nation treatment in all that concerns entering, clearing or stationing." Id.
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Mongolia, 10 7 Korea,10 8 and Vietnam. 10 9 Though the unequal
treaties represented inequality obtained through use of the
MFN principle, China applied the MFN principle in treaties
with its allies as a valid concept regulating trade. By granting
MFN only to its close allies, China limited the use of MFN and
used it to create strategic alliances.
The history of MFN in China lends itself to an argument
that China has to some extent accepted the validity of the concept of MFN and intends to implement MFN. Conversely, the
use of MFN by the KMT and by Communist China in treaties
with its allies illustrates the connection between MFN and politics. The KMT used MFN as a diplomatic tool to gain political
power. 1 10 Chinese communism purposefully merged trade and
politics."' In China's history, trade and politics have been interwoven from the earliest times, and may so continue.
IV.

CHINA'S 1994 FOREIGN TRADE LAW ADOPTS MFN

Today, the most-favored-nation principle in China has been
2
influenced by GATT analysis and application of MFN."
106. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1961, Alb.-P.R.C., art. 2,
reprintedin P.R.C. TREATIES, supra note 104, at 128, 129. "The contracting parties shall grant each other most favored nation treatment in respect of all questions relating to commerce, navigation and all other aspects of economic
relations between the two countries." Id.
107. Treaty of Commerce, Apr. 23, 1958, Mong.-P.R.C., art. 2, reprinted in
P.R.C. TREATIES, supra note 104, at 133, 134.

The contracting parties shall grant each other most-favored-nation
treatment in respect of all questions relating to the customs, particularly the following: customs duties and other duties; storage of goods
in the custody of the customs office; regulations and formalities applicable while the goods are in the custody of the customs office.
Id.
108. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 23, 1958, Korea-P.R.C., art.
2, reprinted in P.R.C. TREATIES, supra note 104, at 137, 138. "The contracting
parties shall grant each other most-favored-nation treatment in respect of all
questions relating to commerce, navigation and all other economic relations between the two countries." Id.
109. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 5, 1962, Vietnam-P.R.C., art.
2, reprinted in P.R.C. TREATIES, supra note 104, at 142, 143. "The contracting
parties shall grant each other most-favored-nation treatment in respect of all
questions relating to commerce, navigation and all other economic relations between the two countries." Id.
110. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (noting KMT's use of
MFN to gain support).
111. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (noting the impact of
Marxist ideology on MFN).
112. General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment: "With respect to customs duties and charges ... any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by
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Though China was formerly a member of the GATT, China went
through a period of withdrawal and must reapply to become a
participating member. 1 3 Since 1980, China has negotiated
with GATT members 1 4 and on July 14, 1986, China formally
5
sought resumption of status as a member of the GATT.11
6
GATT membership would afford China many advantages."1
China needs to implement further reforms7 in order to become a
full-fledged member of the GATT/WTO.11
Today, China is actively negotiating GATT membership."18
China stands to lose between seven and fifteen billion U.S. dollars in exports if the United States does not grant MFN status." x9 This may in part help explain China's motivation to
become a member of the GATT/WTO.120
any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product... ." GATT, supra note 1, at art. 1:1. National Treatment: "The contracting
parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements ... should not be applied to imported or domestic
products so as to afford protection to domestic products." Id. at art. II:1.
113. China was one of the founding members of the GATT. When China
became the People's Republic of China in October, 1949, it was unable to assume its seat in the GATT. The Republic of China occupied the seat until 1950,
when it withdrew. China considers the Republic of China's withdrawal invalid.
The history of China's status in the GATT from 1950 to 1971 is summarized in
JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 4, at 59-66.

114. Id. at 83-92.
115. Id. at 92.
116. The Chinese government anticipated many benefits from full participation in the GATIT. GATT membership would symbolize China's acceptance as
part of the international economy. China would have greater defenses against
protectionism and discriminatory practices of developed countries. GATT membership would reinforce China's right to receive unconditional MFN treatment
and China would receive preferential tariff treatment under U.S. G.S.P. treatment. Furthermore, China would have access to GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanisms, could organize against protectionism and China's
participation might hinder developed countries' internal protectionism influences. From the Chinese reformist's point of view, the international obligations
of the GATT would reinforce reforms. Id. at 92-93.
117. Id. at 94.
118. Chinese WTO ProposalsCalled Positive, but Many DetailsLacking, Officials Say, 12 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1344 (Aug. 9, 1995).
119. Cost to China of U.S. Withdrawing MFN at Least $7 Billion, World
Bank Says, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 541 (Apr. 6, 1994).
120. Although GATT membership does not automatically ensure China
would be granted unconditional MFN status from the United States, GATT/
WTO participation would strengthen China's bid to secure MFN treatment.
Monica Hsiao, China and the GATT: Two Theories of Political Economy ExplainingChina'sDesire for Membership in the GAIT, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J.
431, 436 (1994).
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Chinese economists have recently begun to research and
support the concept of comparative advantage, 12 1 which is the
underlying economic principle supporting the MFN concept in
the GATT.1 2 2 "The acceptance of Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage by many Chinese economists put in place a common foundation for dialogue between them and Western
economists." 123 Several policy institutions have been created in
China specifically to study the GATT and its policies. 12 4 Modern
day GATT policies underlying the MFN principle include achieving comparative advantage, encouraging multilateral trade liberalization, aspiring to trade equality between nations, greater
simplicity and transparency, and governmental restraint.125
Though historically some nations pursued a "conditional MFN"
policy, GATT MFN is unconditional.1 2 6 The increased focus on
GATT policies and Western economic theory, however, must be
analyzed in the context of the traditional Chinese tribute system
and China's bitter history of unequal treatment with the mostfavored-nation principle.

121. JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 4, at 143.
122. Comparative advantage is a theory developed by David Ricardo more
than 150 years ago. He posited that a country would export the product in
which it had the greater advantage, or a comparative advantage, and import
the commodity in which it had a comparative disadvantage. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 17-21, 27, 33 (5th ed. 1973).
123. JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 4, at 143. China has shown an
openness to complying with GATT principles and appears to be learning and
applying GATT principles. Id. at 96-98 (describing China's response to more
than 1,200 questions and answers during 1987-1988 negotiations on China's
request to reenter GATT). Although key negotiators may support GATT principles, full attention must be paid to political opposition and China's historical
context for they will undoubtedly influence the effectiveness of GATT reforms.
124. Research groups on GATT have been established by the University of
International Business and Economics in Beijing, sponsored by the Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, and Shanghai University of Finance
and Economics. Id. at 98.
125. Main Trends and Issues in International Trade: Outstanding Policy
Problems, INT'L TRADE 1983/84, 18, 20. MFN also promotes the transparency of
protective measures. Loretta F. Smith, The GATT and InternationalTrade, 39
BUFF. L. REV. 919, 984 (1991).
126. "Under conditional MFN, when country A grants a privilege to country
C while owing MFN to country B, then country A must grant the equivalent
privilege to B - but only after B has given A some reciprocal privilege to 'pay
for it.'" JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 137 (1989). Unconditional MFN requires A to grant the equivalent privilege to country B without
receiving anything in return. Id. "GATT MFN is clearly unconditional." Id.
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A. DEVELOPMENT AND ENACTMENT OF CHINA'S NEW FOREIGN
TRADE LAW

In the process of China's application to the GATT/WTO,
China has been criticized for the lack of transparency of its
laws. 12 7 China published many trade regulations in an effort to
comply with the GATT. 128 Chinese officials seem to have a
greater interest in developing laws and regulations affecting foreign trade. 29 China's increased publication of trade laws may
be motivated both by a desire to join the GATT and a desire to
nationalize its laws and regulations.. 3 0 The preliminary development of the Foreign Trade Law indicates that the role of law
3
is increasing in economic reforms.' '
Prior to publication of the Foreign Trade Law, China made
a copy available to the GATT Working Party on China. 1 32 On
May 12, 1994, China promulgated its new Foreign Trade
Law.13 3 The Foreign Trade Law sets forth a most-favored-nation clause in its general provisions.' 3 4 The Foreign Trade Law
127. JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 4, at 99. See also Donald C.
Clarke, GA7T Membership for China?, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 517, 528
(1994).
128. Bing Wang, China's New Foreign Trade Law: Analysis and Implications for China's GATT Bid, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 495, 495-96 (1995). "Chinese Vice-President Rong Yiren has reaffirmed that China will continue to
deepen its reforms in finance, taxation, foreign trade...." Rong: Reforms to be
Deepened, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 14, 1994, at 1.
129. Prior to publication of China's new Foreign Trade Law, several articles
and editorials were published outlining the need for judicial or legal implementation of economic regulations. "A leading Chinese official [Luo Gan, SecretaryGeneral of the State Council] yesterday called on the legal sector to play a more
active role in ensuring smooth implementation of reform policies." Ma
Chenguang, Better Legal Services Sought, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 5, 1994, at 1. New
reforms may create new social problems and some groups may not be happy
with the new measures. Id. The judicial sector should play a greater role in
improving the socialist market economy. Id.
Jurist Guo Daohui argues that the market economy needs a legal base and
such legislation should regulate and limit government power and intervention.
Market Economy Needs Legal Base, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 14, 1994, at 4.
130. Clarke, supra note 127, at 518.
131. Wang, supra note 128, at 537.
132. "An early draft of the Foreign Trade Law was apparently made available to the GATT Working Party on China, but was never, to my knowledge,
openly published in China until its formal passage and promulgation in May
1994." Clarke, supra note 127, at 529.
133. Foreign Trade Law, supra note 5.
134. "The People's Republic of China grants Most Favored Nation treatment
or national treatment in the field of foreign trade to opposite concluding or acceding parties in accordance with international treaties or agreements concluded or acceded to, or on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit and
reciprocity." Id. at art. 6.
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was enacted at the same time China and the United States were
battling over U.S. MFN status, 3 5 and while China was negotiating its accession to the GATT. 136 Article 7 of the Foreign
Trade Law takes these political influences into account.' 37 Article 7 reserves to China the ability to retaliate against any coun38
try not willing to abide by the Chinese MFN principle.'
China also retains administrative control throughout the
entire Foreign Trade Law.' 3 9 "[T]he foreign trade law continues
to use licensing and quotas to protect domestic industries, to
safeguard its international monetary standards, and to maintain a balance of international payments." 140 China views these
to implementing reform and maintaining
controls as necessary
14 1
social stability.
The GATT community responded favorably to China's new
trade law.' 42 China must still meet more obligations to become
135. Clinton Meets Chinese Officials; Expresses Human Rights Concerns, 11
Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 706 (May 4, 1994).
136. GATT Chief Sutherland to Visit China to Put Entry Negotiations on
Track, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 707 (May 4, 1994).
137. "If any country or region takes sanctions, restrictions or other similar
measures of a discriminatory nature against the People's Republic of China
with respect to foreign trade, the People's Republic of China may take corresponding measures against such country or region in line with actual circumstances." Foreign Trade Law, supra note 5, at art. 7.
138. Although the Foreign Trade Law applies principles of equality and mutual benefit in trade relations in Article 5, and grants Most Favored Nation
treatment in Article 6, Article 7 allowing sanctions modifies the effect of Articles 5 and 6. See Foreign Trade Law, supra note 5. GATT similarly provides
various exceptions to application of the MFN, however, the WTO now sets forth
a dispute resolution procedure which may make it less necessary to apply these
exceptions. GATT contracting parties must also notify the other parties in writing if they intend to take unilateral action in denying MFN status. GATT,
supra note 1, at art. XIX:2. China's Foreign Trade Law allows unilateral action
without a mechanism of accountability to the contracting party.
139. Ji Jiang Shi Xing De "Wai Mao Fa" You Na Xie Zhu Yao Nei Rong He
Te Dian [The Incoming Foreign Trade Law: Main Content & Major Characteristics], SHANGH i FA ZHi BAO, June 20, 1994, at 3 [available in Chinese]. See
Wang, supra note 128, at 525-31 (explaining how China's Foreign Trade Law
reflects China's desire for developing nation status, the transitional nature of
China's economic system, the inefficiency of China's market mechanism and
lack of genuine independence of Chinese enterprises).
140. Wang, supra note 128, at 527.
141. The foreign trade law is based on the Chinese situation and closer to
international trade practice. The Incoming Foreign Trade Law: Main Content
& Major Characteristics,supra note 139, at 3. The system of Chinese self
supervision is not perfect because the economic enterprise transition is not complete. Id. If China completely abandons the foreign trade enterprise permission, it will cause disorder or chaos of the foreign trade order. Id.
142. See China's First Foreign Trade Law Seen Speeding Its Re-entry into
GATT, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 770 (May 18, 1994).
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a full-fledged member of GATT/WTO, however. 143 The United
States wants conditional MFN status for China, 14 4 but may be
forced to accept unconditional MFN status for China in the
GATT. 1 45 China desires developing country status to allow it
the flexibility to retain control over economic reforms.14 6 Under
GATT Article XVIII, developing country status would allow
China to raise tariffs on products to protect infant industries,
use quantitative restrictions in its balance of payments, or use
7
any measure necessary to promote a particular industry. 14

B.

IMPLEMENTATION OF CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE LAw

There have been no Chinese cases interpreting the Foreign
Trade Law to date. During the recent sanctions implemented by
143. China, Special Report: 1996 Trade Outlook, 13 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA)
134 (Jan. 24, 1996).
Talks on China's accession to the World Trade Organization are scheduled to resume in March. These negotiations made little progress over
1995, despite the U.S. presentation of a "road map" of the types of economic reform necessary for becoming a member of the world trade
body.
Among issues of concern for U.S. industry are China's investment
regime, which U.S. officials have said is being modified to allow for
more, rather than less, state control over investment; state trading
companies; export subsidies; industrial subsidies; and safeguards. In
addition, U.S. firms want China to be more explicit on its offers regarding trading rights, including how the issue of national treatment will
be handled ....
Among the issues, the United States wants to see
China adopt a "standstill obligation" barring them from erecting market barriers to replace ones that are dismantled.
Id.
144. The United States opposes unconditional MFN for China in WTO and
instead supports conditional MFN. Talks Scheduled in Geneva on China WTO
Accession, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1185 (July 12, 1995).
145. Unconditional MFN status is included in a draft protocol for China accession to the WTO. Negotiators on ChinaAccession Agree to Reconvene in October, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1317 (Aug. 2, 1995).
146. "China should enjoy all Gatt rights, including those offered to developing nations, and that its obligations should not be more than those incumbent
on other developing nations." Beijing Demands Gatt Rights, CHINA DAILY, July
4, 1994, at 2; "By insisting on being treated as a developing nation, China is not
seeking to dodge Gatt obligations, Moftec officials insist. 'We just want fairness,'
they say." Jin Man, Sides Dig In on Gatt Question, Bus. WxLY. (CHINA DAILY),
July 25, 1994, at 1.
147. GATT supra note 1, at art. XVIII.
1. [Clontracting parties the economies of which can only support low
standards of living and are in the early stages of development ....
2(a). [T]o maintain sufficient protection required for the establishment
of a particular industry and (b) to apply quantitative restrictions for
balance of payments purposes 3. [T]o grant the governmental assistance required to promote the establishment of particular industries[.]
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the United States under Section 301 of U.S. trade law, 14 8 China
applied the general principles of its Foreign Trade Law. As soon
as the United States invoked sanctions against China, China
threatened to retaliate under the authority of Article 7 of its
Foreign Trade Law. 149 The Foreign Trade Law also sets forth
China's general principles of foreign trade, which emphasize
equality and mutual benefit.15 0
Once China becomes a member of the GATT, China will
have to abide by GATT provisions and settle trade disputes
through the WTO. China grants MFN status unilaterally in
China's Foreign Trade Law to concluding or acceding parties to
treaties.1 5 1 If China becomes a member of the WTO, China's
MFN clause will apply multilaterally to all contracting parties of
the GATT.' 5 2 Chinese officials recognize the requirement imposed by the GATT of multilateral unconditional MFN.15 3 A
question remains over whether China will interpret GATT MFN
as the contracting parties intended.
148. China Cited July 1 under Special 301 law; Copyright Protection Criticized, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1066 (July 6, 1994).
149. U.S., China Announce Trade Sanctions Over Copyright Protection, 12
Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 250 (Feb. 8, 1995).
In Beijing, a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation said Feb. 4 that in light of unilateral U.S. sanctions, China would counter-retaliate under Article 7 of its Foreign
Trade Law. That provision allows China to take 'corresponding measures' toward any similar action, the ministry said, according to Xinhua.
Id.
150. "The People's Republic of China promotes and develops trade relations
with other countries on the basis of principles of equality and mutual benefit."
Foreign Trade Law, supra note 5, at art. 5.
151. "The Peoples' Republic of China grants Most Favored Nation treatment
or national treatment in the field of foreign trade to opposite concluding or accedingparties in accordancewith internationaltreatiesor agreements concluded
or acceded to, or on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit and reciprocity."
Id. at art. 6 (emphasis added). MFN applies to countries on an individual basis
in accordance with treaties with China or to those countries which also grant
reciprocal MFN.
152. Once China becomes a member of the WTO, the language in Article 6,
"to opposite or concluding parties in accordance with international treaties or
agreements," indicates that MFN will be applied to all contracting parties of
GATT. Id.
153. "'China hopes to obtain unconditional most-favoured-nation (MFN)
treatment equivalent to that accorded to all other contracting parties by participating in Gatt. It is important to point out that this is the fundamental international principle applied universally. . . .'" Wang Yong, Denial by Gatt
Wouldn't be Fatal,Moftec Official Says, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 4, 1994, at 1 (quoting
Li Zhongzhou, Deputy Director General for International Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC)).
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U.S.-CHINA DEBATE OVER
CHINA

U.S.

EXTENSION OF

MFN

TO

China's MFN clause cannot be examined without taking
into account the recent heated debate between the United States
and China over U.S. extension of MFN status to China. This
high profile political debate plays an important role in understanding China's interpretation of MFN. U.S. negotiations with
China over MFN are limited because the President must evaluate most-favored-nation status for non-market economies in successive twelve month periods under the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment.' 5 4 Since 1980, the United States has granted
MFN treatment to China every year. 155 After the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in
1989, the renewal of MFN status has engendered much controversy. On May 28, 1993, President Clinton renewed China's
MFN status for one more year subject to conditions set forth in
156
an Executive Order.
China has a tremendous economic incentive to maintain
MFN status in the United States, but MFN status has been subject to high profile debate and controversy. In 1994, the United
States resumed the debate on whether China had met the condi154.
1993).

Trade Act of 1974 §§ 402-05; 19 U.S.C. §§ 2431-32 (1988 & Supp. V

155. H. Con. Res. 204, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980); Presidential Determination No. 83-7, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,585 (1983); Presidential Determination No. 84-9,
43 Fed. Reg. 24,107 (1984); Presidential Determination No. 86-10, 51 Fed. Reg.
22,057 (1986); Presidential Determination No. 88-10, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,407
(1988); Presidential Determination No. 39-14, 54 Fed. Reg. 26,943 (1989); Presidential Determination No. 90-21, 55 Fed. Reg. 23,183 (1990); Presidential Determination No. 91-36, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,757 (1991); Presidential Determination
No. 92-29, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,539 (1992); Presidential Determination No. 93-23, 58
Fed. Reg. 31,329 (1993); Presidential Determination No. 94-26, 59 Fed. Reg.
31,103 (1994); Presidential Determination No. 95-23, 60 Fed. Reg. 31,047
(1995).

156. Exec. Order No. 12,850, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,327 (1993).
[Tihe Secretary shall also determine whether China has made overall,
significant progress with respect to the following:
- taking steps to begin adhering to the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights;
- releasing and providing an acceptable accounting for Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the non-violent expression of their
political and religious beliefs...
- ensuring humane treatment of prisoners...
-

protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; and

-

permitting international radio and television broadcasts into China.
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tions of the Executive Order for MFN renewal. 157 China reacted
angrily to U.S. linkage of MFN status with human rights because it viewed the United States as meddling in its internal
affairs. 158 Various U.S. business interests lobbied for extension
of MFN status to China. 159 China lobbied for continuation as
well. 160 Finally, President Clinton granted continued MFN status to China and decided to delink conditional MFN from human
rights. 1 6 ' Though several Congressional representatives lobbied
to overturn the renewal, 16 2 and delinking MFN and human

157. Sen. Johnston Says Administration Wants to Extend China'sMFN Status, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 51 (Jan. 12, 1994); Bentsen Says China Needs
More Progress on Human Rights Before MFN is Renewed, 11 Intl Trade Rep.
(BNA) 51 (Jan. 12, 1994); Baucus Says Annual Review of China MFN is Anachronism, Urges Unconditionality, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 170 (Feb. 2, 1994);
U.S. Report Says China Falls Short of InternationalHuman Rights Norms, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 169 (Feb. 2, 1994); China Needs More Human Rights
Progress for Clinton to Renew MFN, Official Says, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA)
334 (Mar. 2, 1994); ChristopherSees Progress with China, But Clinton Voices
Disappointment, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 406 (Mar. 16, 1994).
158. "Referring to MFN trade status, many deputies said the US should stop
interfering in other country's internal affairs by using trade as a weapon." Deputies Call for Re-entry in Gatt, Blast US Politics,CHINA DAILY, Mar. 16, 1995, at
2; "'China and the US have different concepts about human rights and these
differences will exist for a long time to come. It's futile and damaging to exert
pressure on the issue[.]'" Zhang Ping, Sino-US Relations Will Develop Despite
Difficulties, Qian Says, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 15, 1994, at 1 (quoting Vice-Premier
Qian Qishen). See also Randall Green, Human Rights and Most-Favored-Nation TariffRates for Productsfrom the People's Republic of China, 17 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 611, 621 (1994).
159. California Business Coalition to Urge Continued MFN for China, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 385 (Mar. 9, 1994); US-China Policy Flawed, Business
Representative Says, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 450 (Mar. 23, 1994); AT&T
Chief Calls for MFN Renewal, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 6, 1994, at 4.
160. China Sends Buying Mission to US; Discussionson MFN Renewal Expected, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 538 (Apr. 6, 1994); Chinese Diplomat Urges
End to Trade-Human Rights Linkage, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 747 (May 11,
1994).
161. Presidential Determination No. 93-23, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,329 (1993);
Exec, Order No. 12,850, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,327 (1993). Clinton Reverses China
MFN Policy; Mitchell to Introduce China Measure, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA)
844 (June 1, 1994).
162. Gephardt,Mitchell IntroducingBills Revoking MFN for Some Chinese
Goods, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 992 (June 22, 1994).
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conditional MFN treatment was

granted to China.164

The Chinese perceive the U.S. yearly debate over MFN as
an insult.165 In traditional Chinese fashion: ". . . matters of legality take a back seat to matters of loyalty, legal rights and
wrongs give way to personal relationships, or, at the national
level, to questions of who is regarded as a 'friend of China's' and
who is not."' 6 6 This interpretation of the MFN clause in U.S.China relations may well reflect popular sentiment in the debate. By viewing application of the U.S. MFN principle as a personal insult, China may be inclined to view the
nondiscrimination principle of its own MFN clause as a vehicle
for retaliation.
The debate over linking MFN to human rights remained a
hot topic in 1995.167 President Clinton recommended renewal of
MFN trade status 168 and MFN was granted on June 2, 1995,169
but the debate still continues. 70 The focus in the United States
163. Robbyn Reichman-Coad, Human Rights Violations in China:A United
States' Response, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 163 (1994) (arguing for
conditioning China's U.S. MFN status on human rights improvements). But
see Green, supra note 158, at 625.
164. House Ways and Means Rejects Bill Revoking MFN for China, 11 Intl
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1068 (July 6, 1994); Clinton China Policy is Endorsed by
House, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1243 (Aug. 10, 1994).
165. China Demands End to US Yearly MFN Trade Review, REUTERS, June
4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News library, REUTERS file; US Spokesman
Urged to Reverse Annual Review of China'sMFN Status, XiNHUA NEWS AGENCY,
June 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News library, XINHUA fie.
166. Professor John Head's experience teaching law in China sheds some
light on the Chinese view of the debate between the United States and China
over China's MFN status. John Head, A FulbrightLecturer'sExperience Teaching InternationalLaw in China, ASIL NEWSLETTER, Sept. 1994, available in
LEXIS, Intlaw library, ASIL file. Many of his students viewed the MFN debate
as a personal insult and often asked why President Clinton dislikes China. Id.
Although Professor Head explained the legal debate in favor of and in opposition to the U.S. position on MFN, he determined that his law students at
Renmin University were not concerned about the role of law in society. Id.
167. Human Rights, Labor Issues and Trade are Still Linked, U.S. Official
Says, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 259 (Feb. 8, 1995).
168. ClintonRecommends Renewal for China of Most-Favored-Nation Trade
Status, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 977 (June 7, 1995).
169. Clinton Renews Favored Trade Status for China, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, June 2, 1995 available in LEXIS, News library, REUWLD file.
170. Ways and Means Adversely Reports DisapprovalResolution for China
MFN, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1055 (June 21, 1995); Human Rights Group
Blasts White House for Breaking Promises on China, Trade, 12 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1186 (July 12, 1995); Clinton Waiting for Congress to Act on China MFN
Amid Concern for Dissident, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1212 (July 19, 1995);
China MFN Renewal Draws Fire for Rights Abuses, REUTER EUROPEAN Bus.
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on MFN renewal affects U.S. policy toward WTO membership
for China. China, in turn, must continue to respond to U.S.
MFN challenges.
V. CHINA'S NEW MFN CLAUSE REFLECTS
REGULATORY REFORM WITHIN THE
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
China's history of trade illustrates the difficulties China
may have in adapting to the GATT/WTO. The tribute system
used a bilateral contract-like relationship with its trading powers. 17 1 While the unequal treaty system was unilateral, it still
consisted of two parties, the European nations as one trading
power achieving concessions unilaterally through MFN, and
China.172 Communist China similarly perceived itself as a representative of communism which should avoid any trade with
capitalist economies. 173 Today, the multilateral trading system
of the GATT presents new challenges of economic integration for
both China and the WTO.
A.

CHINA'S

MFN

CLAUSE REFLECTS HISTORICAL CONCERN FOR

RECIPROCITY

The unequal treaty system of the nineteenth century illustrates China's historical concern over achieving reciprocity in
trade relations. The unequal treaty system changed China psychologically and materially. 174 China specifically
objected to the
17 5
lack of reciprocity in the treaty negotiations.
This recurrent Chinese concern over reciprocity 176 appears
explicitly in China's MFN clause. Article 5 of the Foreign Trade
REP., June 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News library, REUEUB file; Helms
Seeks Bar on China Trade Privileges, REUTERS NORTH AMERICAN NEWS, July
12, 1995, available in LEXIS, News library, REUNA file; Joyce Barrett, China
MFN Status Gets Reprieve; House Tables the Issue, DAILY NEWS REC., July 21,

1995, available in LEXIS, News library, DNR file.
171. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (outlining China's bilateral trading relationships in the tribunal system).
172. See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text (describing the unequal
treaty system).
173. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text (noting Communist
China's view of trade in light of Marxist ideology).
174. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
176. China has a proverbial saying, "li shang wang lai," [ *LOIW I
courtesy demands reciprocity. Wu JINGRONG, THE PIN YIN CHINESE-ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 417 (1985). China's Foreign Trade Minister, Wu Yi, recently responded to U.S. threats of sanctions over copyright by stating that "courtesy
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Law describes the principle by which China engages in foreign
trade. "The People's Republic of China promotes and develops
trade relations with other countries and regions on the basis of
the principles of equality and mutual benefit."17 7 Hence, China
sets forth the principle of mutual benefit or reciprocity as the
overriding purpose of foreign trade.
The language of Article 6 similarly defines MFN as a function of reciprocity and mutual benefit. "The Peoples' Republic of
China grants Most Favored Nation treatment or national treatment in the field of foreign trade to opposite concluding or acceding parties in accordance with international treaties or
agreements concluded or acceded to, or on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit and reciprocity."'7 8 In basing MFN on reciprocity and mutual benefit, the text of Articles 5 and 6 imply
that MFN should be limited to the extent it may impinge on
principles of reciprocity. This is consistent with the historical
tribute system of China and China's treaties granting MFN in
the 1950's and 1960's to its allies. China MFN also addresses
concerns of maintaining equal and reciprocal relationships arising from the historical experience of China under the unequal
treaties.
Once China becomes a member of the GATT, the concerns
over reciprocity may subside because China will have achieved
equal footing with other contracting parties. GATT MFN allows
some flexibility in equal treatment by allowing countries to bargain for preferences, thus supporting an element of reciprocity
in tariff negotiations. By stating that reciprocity is a basis for
MFN status, 1 79 China has signified an intention to interpret
MFN as a reciprocal concept. At the same time, China is lobbying for unconditional MFN and will be required to grant unconditional MFN to GATT members. These contradictions in
foreign policy reflect inner political debate over the efficacy of
GATT membership as well as the larger issue of China's status
in world economic policy.
In China, there are three main approaches to GATT membership. 180 One approach is to view GATT membership as a
demands reciprocity." Guy de Jonquieres & Peter Montagnon, ChinaRefuses to
Kow-Tow on TariffReform, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1996, at 4.
177. Foreign Trade Law, supra note 5, at art. 5 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at art. 6 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at art. 5.
180. Dai Weicheng, "Wo Dui Zhong Guo Fu Guan Qian Jing Bao Le Quan
Tai Du" Fang Zhu Ming Guan Mao Zhuan Jia Wang Yao Tian Jiao Shou ["rm
optimistic of China's prospects returning to GATT" Interview with Professor
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wolf which should never arrive. 18 1 The practical difficulties of
economic reform in China create political opposition to GATT
membership. China is still criticized for failing to implement
necessary reforms to enter the GATT/WTO. 18 2 China's ability to
implement the MFN principle is affected by its ability to enforce
such rights. Currently, trade quotas and nonpublished regulations in China interfere with the nondiscrimination principle re183
quired by the GATT.
Another approach is that GATT membership is inevitable,
therefore China should just wait for it, and industry should rely
upon the state.1 8 4 In fact, Chinese scholars have supported creative interpretation of GATT provisions to protect national enterprises.' 8 5 China is also creating new barriers to replace old
of the non-discrimination principle
ones, in clear contravention
86
of GATT MFN.1
Wang Yaotian, Dean of GATT Research Institute], SHANGHAI FA ZHI BAo, May
3, 1995, at 1 [available in Chinese].
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (describing limitations
of Foreign Trade Law and concerns over adequacy of Chinese reforms).
183. Recent Chinese policies regarding investment, the automobile electronics industries, and taxes have moved China away from WTO norms. China Will
Eliminate TariffExceptions for Foreign Firms' Capital Goods Imports, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1994 (Dec. 6, 1995).
184. Dai Weicheng, supra note 180, at 1.
185. Yan Lingchang, Dui "Fu Guan" Hou Wo Guo Min Zu Gong Ye Fa Lu
Bao Hu De Si Kao ["Some Thoughts About Legal Protection of Our National
Industry After the Return to GATT"], 10 FA HSUEH 164 (Oct. 1994) [available in
Chinese]. "This article would like to approach from legal perspective and the
study of GATT articles on how to make full use of various legal mechanisms of
GATT and international precedents in the hope of providing insight on seeking
legal and legitimate protection measures for our national enterprise after accession to GATT." Id. Yan Lingchang's article outlines various areas which allow
protection by means of the GATT articles. Yan Lingchang analyzes tariffs,
quantity restrictions, Art. XIX on emergency measures, Art. VI on anti-dumping and subsidies, Art. XXIII and Art. XXV on duty exemptions, exceptions,
including Art. XX on exceptions, Art. XXI on national security, Art. XXIV on
border trade, tariff unions and free trade areas, and Art. XXXVI on developing
countries. Id. at 164-169. He also outlines how Western nations take advantage of these articles to impose trade restrictions on China and how China will
also take advantage of these articles.
Yan Lingchang's article may be looked at as an effort to respond to domestic opposition to GATT by explaining legal and legitimate protections allowed
under the GATT. It also demonstrates an effort to continue protecting Chinese
national industry.
186. While China has lifted quotas and licenses on a wide range of imports,
United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky is concerned about
new barriers taking the place of old barriers. U.S. Sets Deadlines For China
For Intellectual Property Compliance, 12 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1994 (Dec. 6,
1995).

1996]

CHINA "S FoREiGN A' DE LAW

409

The third approach is that industries in China should begin
now to make the necessary reforms for GATT membership to
prepare for the challenge of the GATT.18 7 Given the contradictory domestic industry view of WTO membership and the numerous reforms needed, entry into the WTO will not be a
painless endeavor. There will be political pressure to limit
grants of MFN to foreign nations, even though China will be required under the GATT to apply MFN unconditionally.
China's history of non-reciprocal trading relationships indicates that it will work within the multilateral structure of the
GATT to secure favorable reciprocal relationships.1 8 8 China has
already refused to extend negotiated concessions with the
United States to third parties. 18 9 This illustrates China's concern with requiring other countries to negotiate individually and
reciprocally with China. Though the GATT addresses trade issues multilaterally, China has a unique historical perspective
that may influence China to act bilaterally. 190
China also appears to be conscious of eliminating free riders
in its economic negotiations. The unequal treaties of the nineteenth century illustrate an unprecedented free rider problem
by according every concession to other treaty members. 19 1 Similarly, one of the criticisms of GATT MFN is that it allows free
riders to take advantage of negotiated concessions. 19 2 As a result of the historical experience of China with free riders in the
187. Dai Weicheng, supra note 180, at 1.
188. Zuo Haicong, Guan Mao Zong Xie Ding Zheng Duan Jue Tiao Kuan De
Qi Yuan Ni Ding He Nei Rong Ping Xi [The Origination of the Articles of Dispute Resolution of GATT, Drafting and Analysis], 7 FA HSUEH 180 (July 1995)
[available in Chinese]. Zuo Haicong analyzes the history of the GATT articles
of dispute resolution focusing on the history of reciprocity and bilateralism.
Perhaps this historical basis lends legitimacy to the GATT by addressing
China's concerns over reciprocity.
189. "Some Chinese concessions on intellectual property were not made
available to other countries on an MFN basis. US negotiators say the Chinese
insisted on these discriminatory provisions." THoMAs 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY
ANN ELLIOtT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE PoLcY 320 n.5
(1994).
190. "There is an important policy issue in connection with the 'trade constitution's' [GAT'Is] principles of nondiscrimination, particularly the MFN principle.... It must be recognized that MFN policies have some costs as well as
benefits. Thus the question arises, in connection with many trade measures,
whether MFN principles should be observed or not. Closely related, but not
identical, is the question of multilateralism versus bilateralism." JACKSON,
supra note 126, at 306-07.
191. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (outling automatic MFN
extension to Western nations under the unequal treaties).
192. JACKSON, supra note 126, at 136-38.
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unequal treaties, China may be especially concerned about
granting concessions unilaterally.
China argues that it is a developing country and some level
of non-reciprocity under the GATT may be necessary to protect
its interests. 1 93 Nonetheless, China has the largest economy of
any developing nation. 19 4 When China becomes part of the
WTO, China must automatically and unconditionally grant
MFN to contracting parties of the GATT. As the second largest
U.S. trading partner, the United States and other European nations view China's export surge potential as a barrier to WTO
membership.1 95 By refusing to treat China as a developing
country, China views the WTO as creating a non-reciprocal trading relationship. Concerns over Chinese history will provide a
strong argument to Chinese opponents of WTO membership.1 9 6
China's history of non-reciprocity in trade helps provide an understanding of why China so adamantly desires developing
country status. Historical influences in Chinese foreign policy
cannot be underestimated.1

97

193. MOFTEC officials insist that China be treated as a developing country
and be assured of a balance of rights and obligations. Jin Man, supra note 146,
at 1; Li Zhongzhou, Director-General MOFTEC "asserted that China does not
want to be a second class citizen within Gatt. For example, the particular member [United States] has insisted that 'China cannot invoke many Gatt articles,
especially those that apply to developing nations.' Li said this has never happened in Gatt history." Wang Yong, China Plans Tough Gatt Stance: Last Offer Coming: 'Take It or Leave It,'Bus. WKLY. (CHINA DAILY), July 11, 1994, at 1.
194. Joseph Kahn, Dragon FliesChina Swiftly Becomes An Exporting Colossus, Straining Western Ties, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1995, at Al.
195. Id.
196. Chinese politicians often refer to WTO membership with language evidencing concern over China's unequal status. Wang Yong, supra note 193, at 1
(quoting Li Zhongzhou, Director-General MOFERT). See also Jonquieres &
Montagnon, supra note 176, at 4.
197. MANCALL, supra note 11, at 498-501 (discussing history as a source of
Chinese foreign policy).
China views the world in terms of dichotomies that are mutually contradictory, and it defines broad and specific policies in terms of these
dichotomies. Furthermore, China views history as a progression
through dichotomies. Regardless of whether history has an end or an
objective, as some Marxists would insist it has, history is process, in
the Chinese view, and correct policy is that which contributes to the
foreword movement of history or uses history to achieve history's more
immediate objectives.... The best policy uses history to achieve this
justice. Consequently all policy, and ultimately, all judgments are relative to the immediate moment in which history, as process and structure, presents itself.
Id. at 500.
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MFN CLAUSE EMBODIES CHINA'S POLITICAL

TRADITIONS

China has never differentiated the regulation of trade from
politics. The tribute system allowed trade as a consequence of
paying tribute under a political relationship. 198 The unequal
treaties came into being as a result of military concessions. 19 9
20 0
MFN was similarly inextricably linked to politics by the KMT
20
and Communist China.
Though China currently desires the
benefits offered by the GATT and especially covets unconditional
MFN status in the United States, China may have particular
difficulties differentiating regulatory trade from politics.
China MFN is inextricably linked to politics as China attempts to achieve WTO membership. By employing protectionism in its new Foreign Trade Law and maintaining some of its
bureaucratic controls, China has not fully complied with standards necessary to enter the WTO. 20 2 The United States has

used China's desire to enter the WTO as a bargaining chip to
encourage changes in Chinese trade regulation. 20 3 China appears, however, to have become impatient with its outsider status and while desiring the benefits of WTO membership, China
downplays its importance. 20 4 In fact, recent Chinese policies
have moved away from WTO norms. 20 5 If China downplays the
importance of WTO membership, then U.S. incentives for supporting Chinese membership may lose their force. China MFN
is therefore dependent upon the political importance attributed
to WTO membership.
Article 7 of the Foreign Trade Law links China MFN to current politics by allowing China to retaliate for failures of other
contracting parties to abide by MFN. 20 6 This calls into question
the full effect of Article 6 granting MFN treatment. The ability
of China to take unilateral, retaliatory action allows it to avoid
the guarantee of MFN in the GATT. This is not a problem
198. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (describing the overriding political nature of tribune in securing trading relationships).
199. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (noting the prominence
of MFN in KMT's efforts to abolish the unequal treaties).
201. See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text (outlining Chinese
grants of MFN to create strategic alliances).
202. Wang, supra note 128, at 527.
203. BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note 189, at 317-22.
204. China will not rejoin GATT at the cost of future prospects. Wang Yong,
supra note 193, at 1; Hsiao, supra note 120, at 431-32.
205. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
206. Foreign Trade Law, supra note 5, at art. 7.
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unique to China. U.S. policies under Section 301 have been similarly criticized. 20 7 Many other countries also implement retaliatory actions against other nations for failing to abide by nondiscrimination principles in trade.20 8 Widespread usage of domestic retaliatory actions outside the WTO may undermine the
20 9
effectiveness of the GATT.
What differentiates China's use of retaliation under MFN
from Western nations is that China has never historically regulated trade as a distinct entity apart from politics. China continues to assert it will retaliate immediately. 2 10 By threatening
withdrawal of MFN status for China based on human rights, the
United States bolsters the conceptual connection of MFN to politics. China believes the U.S. position violates proper notions of
reciprocity and mutual benefit. 2 1 1 Once China becomes a member of the GATT/WTO, it seems unlikely that Chinese foreign
policy will abide by unconditional, automatic MFN when it becomes politically expedient to achieve other goals.
VI.

CONCLUSION

By adopting an MFN clause in its Foreign Trade Law,
China has not simply adopted and incorporated the GATT's
MFN principle. For China MFN is a principle that has played a
significant role in its foreign trade history. China's interpretation of MFN will be influenced by this historical experience.
The ancient tributary system paints a picture of China's experience applying non-discriminatory treatment in unequal relationships to its tributaries. When Western nations introduced
MFN in the unequal treaties, China's position as the superior
was turned upside-down. The MFN clause of the unequal treaties allowed Western nations to acquire tariff concessions without granting any reciprocal concessions to China. The KMT and
Communist China subsequently condemned the unequal treaty
system as commercial exploitation. China's history thus explains why China may be particularly concerned about achieving reciprocity in trade negotiations.
207. BAYARD & ELLIOrr, supra note 189, at 317-22.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. In response to U.S. threats over copyright sanctions, China's Foreign
Trade Minister Wu Yi says China will defend itself if attacked by the United
States. Jonquieres & Montagnon, supra note 176, at 4.
211. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (describing the Chinese
view of the debate over U.S. extension of MFN to China).
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While China's MFN clause represents regulatory reform,
China's history of trade, at the very least, indicates inexperience
in differentiating the regulation of trade from politics. During
the tribute system, trade was always linked to the political act of
tribute. Similarly, the unequal treaties regulated trade by eliminating China's bargaining power. Communist China likewise
granted MFN to its allies in the 1950's and 1960's to create strategic alliances. Though China attempted to implement regulatory reform in its new Foreign Trade Law, China enacted its
MFN clause in the midst of a heated political debate over U.S.
extension of MFN to China. Given China's inexperience in separating trade from political actions, it seems likely China will
have considerable difficulty applying MFN unconditionally
when political expediencies arise.
Though China has a powerful incentive to comply with
GATT MFN, the complexity of economic reform will make compliance difficult. China will interpret MFN in the context of its
historical experience, political views and cultural understanding. 2 12 The history of MFN in China explains China's incentive
to limit application of MFN and request developing country status in the GATT/WTO. China's undeniable presence in the
world economy presents a perplexing puzzle for the GATT and
the WTO. The difficulties attendant to China's interpretation of
MFN illustrate the complexities facing the GATT in fully integrating diverse historical and political views in a global economic constitution.

212. China's approach to the role of law in foreign trade may cause it to
misinterpret trade policies of other nations. PorrER, supra note 3, at 20.
"While China's participation in GATT and the [WTO] may well militate against
many of the mercantilist policies of the past, this... will require fundamental
changes in policies and attitudes." Id. at 21.

